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Abstract 
There has been private sector involvement in the delivery of public services in the Irish State 
since its foundation. Ireland is a latecomer to PPP and, prior to the credit crisis, was seen as a 
‘rapid follower’ relying primarily on the UK PPP model in the procurement of infrastructure in 
transport, education, housing/urban regeneration and water/wastewater.  PPP activity in Ireland 
stalled during the credit crisis, and some projects were cancelled, but it has taken off again 
recently with part of the Infrastructure and Capital Investment Plan 2016 – 2021 to be delivered 
through PPP showing continuing political commitment to PPP.  
Ireland’s interest in PPP cannot be explained by economic rationale alone, as PPP 
was initiated during a period of prosperity. We consider three alternative explanations: 
voluntary adoption – where the UK model was closely followed; coercive adoption – where 
PPP policy was forced upon Ireland; and institutional isomorphism – where institutional 
creation and change was promoted to aid public sector organisations in gaining institutional 
legitimacy. We find evidence of all three patterns, with coercive adoption becoming more 
relevant in recent years. 
This paper therefore asks why PPP was adopted and how this adoption pattern has 
affected the sustainability of PPP in Ireland.  This paper defines PPP; examines the background 
to the PPP approach adopted in Ireland; outlines the theoretical framework of the paper: 
transfer theory and institutional theory; discusses the methodology; reports on findings and 
gives conclusions. 
Keywords: Public private partnership, policy transfer, isomorphism 
Type of paper: Short paper  
 1 Definition of Public Private Partnership 
According to the UK government, PPPs can be described as procurement approaches 
that bring public and private sectors together in long-term partnerships for mutual 
benefit (Akintoye et al., 2003).  The Irish government defines PPP as a public services 
and infrastructure procurement method with an emphasis on value for money and 
delivering quality public services.i  
 
2 Background: PPP Adoption in the Republic of Ireland 
Ireland has a history of private sector involvement in service and infrastructure 
delivery.  Religious institutions have run schools and hospitals (Connolly et al., 
2009b), and in the 1980s and 1990s Dublin’s toll bridges were built with private 
sector involvement and there was privatisation of refuse collection (Reeves, 2003).  
PPPs were formally introduced following the Report to the Inter-
Departmental Group in Relation to Public Private Partnerships (Farrell Grant Sparks 
and Goodbody Economic Consultants, in association with Chesterton Consulting, 
1998).  There was little justification of why the Irish government should adopt these 
policies (Hearne, 2009).  The motivation appears to have been filling the so-called 
infrastructure gap, which arose from curtailment of capital spending in the 1980s and 
1990s.  Thereafter investment relied heavily on fiscal transfers (Reeves, 2003).  
Between 1993 and 2000, European transfers became less important due to economic 
growth which made Ireland the fastest growing OECD economy by 2000 (Reeves, 
2003).   Ireland’s budget deficit never went above 3% during the 1990s and the gross 
government debt ratio fell below 60% in 1998 until 2008.  Accordingly, there was no 
pressing need to finance infrastructure through PPP, so why did a fiscally healthy 
Ireland engage in PPP? Explanations for the adoption of PPPs arise from the literature 
on policy transfer and institutional isomorphism, which are discussed below.  
 
3 Theoretical Framework: Policy Transfer Theory and 
Institutional Theory 
The study of policy transfer draws on policy diffusion studies, a sub-set of 
comparative politics literature (Evans, 2009; Dolowitz et al., 1996).   Policy transfer 
causes organisations to mimic others (Dolowitz et al., 1996).  Early transfer studies 
focused on voluntary transfer which can occur where there is dissatisfaction with the 
status quo and perceived policy failure.  More recent studies explore coercive transfer 
which occurs when supra-national institutions, eg IMF, force the adoption of a policy 
(Dolowitz et al., 1996).     
 Some studies of change involving the diffusion of institutional elements 
utilise policy transfer and institutional isomorphism as cognate terms (Marsh et al., 
2009).  There is a rationale for combining policy transfer and institutional theories 
(Radaelli, 2000) and this study takes this approach.  Governments operate in an 
institutional environment which influences their actions (Matos ‐Castaño et al., 
2014), and institutional theory can explain why governmental organisations often 
mimic each other (Connolly et al., 2009a).  Institutional theories assume that, to gain 
organisational legitimacy and secure access to resources, organisations must meet 
expectations by external and internal stakeholders (Brignall et al., 2000).  
Organisational structure, policies and procedures relate to expectations and ‘myths’ 
about what is socially and economically acceptable, which are rationalised and gain 
legitimacy (DiMaggio et al., 1983; Brignall et al., 2000).  
  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) describe three types of institutional 
isomorphism – coercive, mimetic and normative.  Connolly et al. (2009a) suggest UK 
PPP adoption was mostly coercive as projects would otherwise not be implemented 
(Newberry, 2004).  The manner in which PPPs were introduced into Ireland is said to 
have involved ‘mimicry’ rather than coercion. 
Research into the institutional impacts on the implementation of PPP 
explores successful institutional environments as a context where governments 
understand the complexity of PPPs (Willems et al., 2011).  PPPs require new types of 
institutional capacity (Jooste et al., 2009) and institutional shortcomings can lead to 
performance problems and a lack of transparency (Matos-Castano et al., 2014).     
Jooste, Levitt and Scott (2009) propose a theoretical framework of PPP 
success/sustainability including 19 measures grouped under the three main objectives 
necessary to ensure the successful development of a PPP: building capacity, obtaining 
legitimacy and balancing interests (Jooste et al., 2009).  We apply nine measures to 
our studyii  combining the framework with Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) predictions to 
explore whether institutional environments were changed to make PPP policy 
sustainable.   
Based on the literature, we expect that the most sustainable PPP environment 
is associated with [2], voluntary policy transfer with strong institutional capacity 
building, where institutional environments and institutional capacity are changed and 
developed to meet the challenges arising from PPP procurement [see Table 1].  This is 
followed by [4], coercive policy transfer and strong institutional capacity building; 
[1], voluntary policy transfer and weak institutional capacity building; and [3], 
coercive policy transfer and weak institutional capacity building.  The results section 
examines these aspects in the Irish context. 
 
 
 
 Table 1: Factors affecting the sustainability of PPP policy transfer     
 
     LEVEL OF CAPACITY BUILDING 
    
     Weak   Strong 
Voluntary (1) Voluntary PT &  (2)  Voluntary PT &  
weak institutional    strong institutional 
capacity building    capacity building 
TYPE OF POLICY TRANSFER  
 
Coercive (3) Coercive PT &  (4)        Coercive PT & 
weak institutional   strong institutional 
capacity building  capacity building  
 
4 Methodology 
The research takes a predominantly deductive approach in which the predictions of 
our combined framework are contrasted with concrete experiences of recent Irish PPP 
developments.    We draw on a series of key PPP policy-making documents.   Our 
focus is on how patterns of PPP adoption and aspects of institutional capacity building 
have affected the sustainability of Ireland’s PPP programme.  The analysis suggests 
improvements in the sustainability of this PPP programme to avoid the rapid policy 
shifts observed in other venues. 
 
5 Results   
Evidence of Policy Transfer 
Ireland’s role as a late adopter of UK style PPP is exemplified by PPP policy 
guidelines produced in the UK and Ireland (Sheppard, 2016).  Guidelines for the 
local government sector (Department of the Environment, 2003) closely mirrored 
the UK Green Book (HM Treasury, 2003).   These concern PPP project 
 implementation; public sector training; expertise provision through a procurement 
unit; allocation of risk between parties; and the public sector comparator. 
 
Evidence of Institutional Capacity Building 
Applying the Jooste, Levitt and Scott framework (2009), our analysis of institutional 
sustainability focuses on nine measures: supportive legal framework, political 
commitment, buy-in from key constituents, good public sector knowledge of PPPs, a 
PPP unit, measures to coordinate deal flow, program transparency, and ensuring 
project quality while implementing independent oversight.   
 
(1) Supportive legal framework  
In 2001-02 Ireland legislated to facilitate state participation in PPPs: the Transport 
(Railway Infrastructure) Act 2001; the State Authorities (Public Private Partnership 
Arrangements) Act 2002; and the National Development Finance Agency Act 2002.  
The last established the National Development Finance Agency (NDFA) which funds 
infrastructure through long-term debt and equity.  The role of the NDFA expanded 
through amending legislation tasking it with establishing a Centre of Expertise for 
PPP.  The NDFA also was to provide contract management services for PPPs.  
Accordingly a consistent legal framework to support PPP implementation appears to 
be in place.  
 
(2) Political commitment 
PPP was endorsed by the government in 1999 through a number of PPP pilot projects 
(Connolly et al., 2009b).  The National Development Plan 2000 – 2006 (NDP) 
confirmed government commitment by highlighting its potential in transport and 
environmental projects. This was abandoned with the crisis which put 24 projects on 
hold (Reeves, 2013b).  
Following recommendations by the Irish Business and Employers 
Confederation (IBEC), the Minster for Public Expenditure and Reform announced a 
€2.25 billion domestic infrastructure stimulus programme in 2012, iii with €1.4 billion 
delivered through PPP.  The government also agreed €250 million in new PPP 
projects in schools, energy efficiency and roads.  
One motivation for this PPP programme was to stimulate the economy.  
Moreover, the NDFA explained that PPP helped keep borrowing ‘off balance sheet’ 
(NDFA, 2013).  This suggests that the relevance of PPP to Irish politics changed 
significantly by 2013. PPP was no longer voluntary but became a necessity in 
 maintaining adequate public investment.  Political commitment had increased 
considerably from PPP being seen as a fashionable approach to procurement which 
created an image of modernisation and modernity in line with UK policy, to PPP 
being the main option in dealing with a capital spending shortfall.   
 
(3) Buy-in from key constituents 
Buy-in from key constituents is illustrated by key submissions and reports supporting 
PPPs by organisations such as the Irish employers’ association, the construction 
industry, advisory groups and, initially, trade unions and community groups. In 1998, 
the employers’ association and the Construction Industry Federation (CIF) presented 
a report to government which argued for PPPs as a means of addressing the 
infrastructure deficit (Reeves, 2003). The social partnership agreement, Programme 
for Prosperity and Fairness, (Department of the Taoiseach, 2000) stated that PPP 
would contribute significantly to the implementation of the NDP and that relevant 
social partners would agree mechanisms to deliver efficient, transparent and fair 
contracts, tendering and contractual procedures for PPP procurement.   
The November 2001‘Framework for Public Private Partnerships’ (Public 
Private Partnership Advisory Group, 2001) created an advisory group comprising 
representatives of  employers, trade unions, the CIF and the main PPP agencies.  The 
unions interpreted the PPP consultation guidelines as stipulating detailed 
consultations on Procurement Assessment Reports (PAR), which consider different 
procurement alternatives in terms of economics, engineering and organisation. iv  In 
the case of a replacement wastewater treatment plant PAR in 2007, engagement with 
stakeholders took place (Reeves, 2013a).  In the case of another PAR in mid-2006, of 
a mixed tenure housing and urban regeneration PPP, consultation was less 
cooperative and failed to facilitate agreement.  The economic crash resulted in this 
PPP project collapsing in 2008 (Reeves, 2013a).  
There appears to have been buy-in to PPP by employers, the CIF and, 
initially, the unions.  Trade union experience with the 2006 PAR and the experience 
in the mixed tenure housing development indicate that this has been less so in recent 
years as PPP implementation has become more coercive.     
 
(4) Improving public sector knowledge of PPPs 
In 1998 an interdepartmental group (IDG) commissioned a report on the introduction 
of PPPs with a focus on roads, which discussed so-called hiccups in implementing 
PPPs, as experienced by the UK.  Discussions with the UK Treasury Task Force 
convinced the IDG to create a central PPP unit in 1999, as well as PPP units in the 
Departments of the Environment, Education and Public Enterprise (Connolly et al., 
2009b).     
  There is evidence of efforts to provide PPP-specific training to public sector 
staff.  Also it appears the IDG endeavoured to learn from the UK experiences, but it is 
unclear whether this was effectively communicated to key public sector managers.  
 
(5) Establishing a PPP unit 
Founded in 2002, the NDFA can be considered partially to fulfil the functions of a 
‘dedicated PPP unit’.  In 2012 the UK HM Treasury called for a stronger government 
role where equity investment would be managed by ‘a commercially-focused central 
unit located in Treasury . . .  managed by individuals with the appropriate professional 
skills’.  Irish employers’ call for the establishment of a ‘National Infrastructure 
Authority’ with strategic policy responsibility for determining whether PPP is an 
adequate delivery mechanism indicates similar dissatisfaction with the existing 
arrangements. This is mirrored by trade union demands for cross-departmental 
coordination of PPP activity (Irish Congress of Trade Unions 2011), which suggests 
that while the NDFA acts partially as a PPP unit, it does not yet fulfil all the functions 
it ideally should.   
 
(6) Coordinating deal flow 
In March 2013, the Minister for Public Works announced changes to PPP projects 
aimed at instilling confidence and maximising market participation.  These were: 
reducing to 15 months the timeframe for preparing PPP projects to the market through 
to contract award; reimbursing bid costs to unsuccessful bidders; and streamlining the 
PPP process with less documentation prior to bidding. 
There are similarities between this and the PF2 reform measures introduced 
in the UK by HM Treasury in December 2012.  The UK reforms reduced the 
tendering phase of PF2, allowed the government to subsidise bid costs, and reduced 
the amount of design work to be carried out for bids (HM Treasury, 2012).  During 
the crisis the UK expected the pipeline of PFI deals to stimulate national and local 
economies (National Audit Office, 2010), which mirrors Ireland’s expectation that an 
infrastructure stimulus would be delivered through PPP.v 
Both Ireland and the UK have taken measures to increase the PPP deal flow 
post the 2008 crisis.  This reflects the vulnerability of the PPP industry to economic 
shocks and indicates that both Ireland and the UK lacked a well structured national 
infrastructure policy.  The similarities of adopted measures indicate a lasting legacy of 
policy transfer.   
 
 
 (7) Improving programme transparency 
Policies aimed at improving the transparency of the PPP process in Ireland have been 
contradictory.  A 2012 Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) report 
recommended that ‘evaluations of the value for money expected to be achieved 
through procurement of projects by means of PPP should be published’ and ‘... PPP 
cannot proceed unless it is found likely to deliver better value than traditional 
procurement’ yet ‘few value for money reviews of PPP projects have been 
published.’vi  The NDFA carried out value for money testing on a schools bundle 
project, but the results of the final deal were not disclosed as they could compromise 
negotiations.  Similarly when discussing PPPs carried out by the Department of 
Education, the Secretary General of the Department responded to requests for 
disclosure that ‘we will have to make the call in terms of commercial sensitivity ... the 
public sector benchmark decision certainly is commercially sensitive for a number of 
years.’   
There have been few value for money reviews of PPPs in Ireland, yet other 
jurisdictions make such information available.  The government of Victoria, 
Australia, provides disclosure on all PPP contracts (English et al. 2004).  It is not 
surprising that employers have called for greater transparency around the planning 
process (IBEC, 2013). Although value for money assessments are given central 
importance by the Irish government, full evaluation is not taking place.   
 
(8) Ensuring project quality 
Expected benefits of PPP included a focus on service outcomes rather than assets, 
optimum risk allocation, and value for money.  These expectations were not fully 
confirmed by later reports.  
A 2004 C&AG value for money report on the Grouped Schools Pilot 
Partnership Project noted that procuring/running schools through PPP would result in 
a saving of around 6%.   However, recognising that ‘the analysis contained errors in 
relation to the timing and discounting of payments and overestimated the residual 
value of the school buildings at the end of 25 years’,vii  subsequent analysis suggested 
that PPP was between 13% and 19% more expensive, with relatively little risk 
transfer to the private sector.     
Reeves (2013a) writes that the Department of the Environment initially 
estimated the whole-life costs of a replacement wastewater treatment plant to be 2.3% 
lower under traditional procurement, but a re-worked estimate indentified a 
differential of less than 1% in favour of traditional procurement.  Nonetheless, the 
Department proceeded with the PPP (Reeves 2013a).  Despite problems, there is 
evidence of some success, as exemplified by a post-project review of the Criminal 
Courts of Justice PPP,viii  where a 2008 C&AG report verified 6% lower costs for the 
PPP (IBEC, 2011).  
 Regarding the quality of Irish PPP projects, there is only mixed evidence of 
value for money and risk transfer being achieved, with some projects performing 
within or above expectations and others being disappointing.   
 
(9) Implementing independent oversight 
Regulatory oversight of Irish PPPs is problematic.  Responsibility for water services 
and water/wastewater PPPs transferred from the 34 local authorities to stated-owned 
Irish Water in 2014.  The C&AG does not audit the accounts of commercial state 
companies and subsidiaries.  The Commission for Energy Regulation has 
responsibility for regulating water and reviewing Irish Water’s underlying costs in 
providing water and wastewater services. ix Whether this will involve the publication 
of information on PPPs is unclear.   
As statutory financial adviser, the NDFA oversees procurement of PPPs in 
sectors other than transport, local authorities and certain education projects.x  It 
performs its functions through the National Treasury Management Agency, and while 
its fees and expenses are audited by the C&AG, the auditor does not oversee 
procurement decisions nor publish performance monitoring results of the NDFA.   
This suggests a high degree of fragmentation in the regulatory oversight of 
Irish PPP, which would be unproblematic if each agency carried out its assessment to 
similar standards.  However, current practice makes performance comparisons of 
PPPs across different areas difficult.  
  
6 Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to identify the impact of adoption patterns on the 
sustainability of PPP.  Combining policy transfer and institutional theory, four 
possible adoption patterns were identified:  
- voluntary policy transfer with strong institutional capacity building;  
- coercive policy transfer and strong institutional capacity building;  
- voluntary policy transfer and weak institutional capacity building; and  
- coercive policy transfer and weak institutional capacity building.   
Preliminary research suggests policy transfer was initially largely voluntary, 
although specific elements of implementation, such as limits on transparency on 
account of commercial sensitivity, were perceived as coercive. This was largely 
attributed to industry expectations which had developed within the UK PFI market. 
 In the pre-crisis period, government saw PPP as a means of catching up with 
‘modern procurement methods’ as practised in other English-speaking countries such 
as the UK where ministers wanted to introduce ‘innovative, entrepreneurial business 
values’ into public services (Weaver, 2003).  More recent Government documents and 
other published reports seem to indicate that PPP has ceased to be a voluntary option, 
being perceived instead as an economic necessity.  This seems to have given rise to 
the accelerated development of a supportive legal framework and enabling measures.   
Despite this not all the nine factors have been achieved.  We found mixed 
results in gaining buy-in from key constituents, which was fairly broad in the early 
stages, with support being articulated by the employers’ association, industry bodies 
and trade unions but eroded by the late 2000s, with trade unions as well as community 
groups voicing concerns over inadequate consultation.     
The lack of frameworks for ensuring PPP quality appears to be the most 
significant institutional barrier to the sustainability of Irish PPP.  This concerns the 
issues of objective and systematic value for money evaluations of existing and future 
deals.  Uncertainty about risk allocation between partners and the costing of risk 
transfer seems to affect adversely the accuracy and reliability of value for money 
calculations. 
Major difficulties in the sustainability of Irish PPPs also arise from lack of 
transparency and poor oversight.  Overall, the institutional framework is not fully 
developed and there is need for improvement.  
PPP is not the only game in town and from a practitioner point of view the 
adoption of PPP should be voluntary. Alternatives should be examined for each 
project and underpinned by rational decision-making.  If such decision-making is not 
employed, and value for money testing is not robust enough to prevent excessive 
profits, there is a real danger of PPP becoming a long-term threat to public finance. 
For Ireland to create a strong, sustainable framework for PPP implementation requires 
the creation of credible and transparent accountability frameworks linked to a broader 
vision about the future of the nation’s infrastructure and the desirable characteristics 
of procurer-provider relationships. 
 
 
i www.ppp.gov.ie 
ii The following remaining measures will form part of our extended study were: 
increasing public awareness and understanding of PPPs; developing a market of 
private providers; providing government support for private providers; keeping line 
agency discretion in check; monitoring behaviour of private providers; increasing 
                                                          
                                                                                                                                           
program accountability; ensuring management support to public sector agencies on 
specific projects; ensuring PPP projects promote the public interest; ensuring fairness 
of PPP procurement; and improving environmental performance of projects. 
iii http://per.gov.ie/2012/07/17/minister-howlin-announces-an-additional-e2-25-
billion-domestic-infrastructure-stimulus-to-create-much-needed-jobs/ 
iv Public Private Partnership – Stakeholder Consultation for Employees and their 
Representatives, January 2005. 
v See note ii 
vi C&AG Report on the Accounts of the Public Services 2011 (September 2012), 
chapter 6, paragraph 6.30 and 6.50.  
vii C&AG  Report on Value for Money Examination 48, The Grouped Schools Pilot 
Partnership Project, June 2004, page 11. 
viii C&AG Report on the Accounts of the Public Services 2012 (September 2013), 
paragraph 3.28. 
ix www.CER.ie/water/ 
x C&AG Report on the Accounts of the Public Services 2013 (September 2014), 
paragraph 17.29. 
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